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Abstract 
Created in Indonesia, the production sharing agreement (PSA) is used by the oil industry in developing 
countries to mitigate risks and ensure profits. The PSA has been discredited in the developed world due to 
a lack of transparency and perception as a wealth transferor from impoverished to rich. A theoretical 
discussion and holistic case study on a critical position demonstrates how this 19th-century, neo-colonial 
contract has an inverse effect on human development capital investments by way of state-guaranteed 
reimbursements. These reimbursements promote overspending and unstructured development costs. A 
lack of structure allows the commingling of expenses and hides profits. Effectively, the PSA binds a host 
nation s citizens to the decision making of oil investors and ruling elites via personalized transactions that 
elude public interest and audits. Educational development theories do not consider economic distortions 
that intentionally weaken social empowerment. The PSA plays a significant role in explaining the 
-rich developing countries from significantly advancing their 
peoples. 
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Introduction  
 This study pursues a narrow aspect of the upstream oil business: the production sharing 
agreement  (PSA) that has an outsized contextual influence on employment and human resource 
development in oil-rich economies.  Many developing countries with oil and gas resources sign PSAs (in 
some areas called production sharing contracts  or (PSCs) with the large multinational oil companies as a 
direct means to get cash infusions and oil production started (Rutledge, 2004).  PSAs confer fiscal 
security to outside investors in developing countries (Seck, 2002).  However, they have been largely 
barred, in the developed world, as a perceived abuse of bargaining power with inexperienced government 
officials against well-informed oil executives complemented with savvy legal counsel.  Some consider 
PSAs similar to the colonial concession agreements of the 19th century (Machmud, 1999).  From a 
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sustainability and development standpoint, most of these PSAs are Faustian bargains for a developing 
 citizenry (or the owners) of the natural resource. 1   They are a system designed to ensure a 
return on investment in perceived risky environments.  Simply, despite the fact that PSAs contractually 
promise local development, it is ambiguous as to how. PSAs, to the benefit of the oil companies, bind a 
host country to their investment risks through guarantees. There are two main themes of concern for 
human resource development (HRD): the building block of human capital (Becker, 1993), inside of the 
PSA. Namely:   
           
 While the oil companies do in fact pay large cash bonuses to start these agreements to host 
governments, the problem is that they are fully reimbursed (Gao, 1993), without audit, for educational 
outlays, training (including expatriate training), salaries, fees, etc., without any oversight as to the quality 
of these local development initiatives. PSAs have become the source of tremendous political and social 
friction over the years between oil companies and host governments. 2 This tension is palpable in the way 
training is apparently dissected in the companies: to commingle (hide) and mitigate true costs and 
increase profits. This type of guaranteed reimbursement by the host government to foreign companies 
becomes questionable as: 
a) Under the PSA, all educational and training decisions (HRD) are made by the investing oil 
company. Local education directives and education ministries are not connected to it. Tech transfer, 
current skills, and proprietary information flow are then tightly controlled, and in fact are non-
existent for key proprietary drivers. Locals gain little strategic knowledge in these operations 
sectors. An exception to the PSA contractual model is in Malaysia and China, where national 
economic interest places local knowledge development on the investor; otherwise, there are 
sanctions. 3 
b) Unstructured or ineffective training is also reimbursed to the oil companies at full costs for what is 
given, plus an overhead administrative charge (10% is considered normal, Machmud). There is no 
(if the training is purely an internal corporate matter) 
and no input by the citizenry over things such as costs, relevancy, market value, and hiring outcomes 
for this training. This type of training then can be abused as an alternative revenue enhancer for the 
investing entity. Human development becomes a secondary or tertiary concern as long as the letter 
of the contract is being met.  
 
 
1 PSAs in summary (Rutledge, 2004)  highlight the following investment characteristics: 
 A contract between a multinational oil company and a host government, in which the corporation provides capital 
investment, in exchange for control over an oilfield, and access to a large share of the revenues from it. 
 Lasting usually 25-40 years and sometimes even indefinitely. 
 A change of language, describing the state as "owner" and the foreign company as contractor , but in practice mostly 
equivalent to the old-style concession agreements.  
 Precise terms depend on negotiation between state and company. 
 Often contains stablisation clause , which restricts future governments' ability to change tax rates or pass any new law 
which affects the company's profits.  
2  -  is a monograph about how considerable and 
that are untenable. It is widely and economically understood that under the original terms of the PSA, it 
would take many years to pay off the reimbursements before any funds would accrue to public coffers in 
Siberia.  
3 Sanctions mean that costs will not be reimbursed unless they deliver training that locals can actually use. 
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 Employment outcomes or decision making  in succession planning to key positions, a core tenet 
of Human Resource Development, (Rothwell, 1992) is never truly realized by local people, and 
. The investing entity under the PSA is only required to provide training, similar to 
providing a part, asset, or tangible good. The quality, objectivity, outcome, and ultimate market value of 
that training are undefined, as there is no accountability if the training or education fails to deliver any 
market skills. There is a built-in obsolescence to this training that ensures that all critical resource 
extraction methods, -how , tech transfer, legal knowledge, proprietary information, and returns on 
investment are held by the foreign investor in perpetuity (or in project terms, 20 years). Foreign 
expatriates staff core knowledge and key decision-making posts, while local citizens are left to mundane 
tasks, such as maintenance and blue-collar tasking. There is little meaningful local worker engagement.  
 
Background and review regarding localization and oil ownership. 
 
According to 1990 economics Nobel laureate, Douglas North (1993), neither theories of 
economics that take politics as exogenous nor theories of politics that take economics as exogenous are 
capable of explaining the process of modern social development. The key to understanding modern social 
development is in understanding that the state in a limited access order society is a coalition of powerful 
individuals and groups. This type of political economy arrangement is called  It is 
characterized by personal (face-to-face) transactions, not impersonal (competitive-based) ones. Because 
natural states  have internal forces built on exclusion, privilege, and rent creation, they foster stable orders  
and are therefore extremely difficult to transform. This leads to a proposition: the origin of property rights 
and legal systems is then the definition of elite rights. To change this requires a transformation in society 
from a limited-access to an open-access basis. Empowerment is then realized in ownership and societal 
support via competitive and impersonal transactions. Posits a. and b. are put forward to demonstrate these 
transactions further:- 
a) The subsurface asset is owned by all the citizenry via the state. This is enshrined in law, but not 
always regarded by the oil companies or the host governments. Much has been written about 
letter of the law  (Machmud, 1999; Taverne, 1996). 
The spirit of these laws is much different. It has been persuasively shown that corruption tends to be 
associated with opportunities for rent creation correlated with natural resource extraction (Ades and 
Di Tella). This gets to the core  How to develop human capital by 
utilization of those resources in situ. Political competition, then, has the potential to act as a check on 
corruption. Under the PSA, the resources are recognized as owned by the state. State  does not 
always equal citizens  (Luo, 2006). The PSA provides training , but is it to the benefit of the 
citizen s  improvement?4 Or, is it to the benefit of elites and investors who can ration knowledge 
transfer?  
b) Employment then is in the necessary component of ownership via work skills with attendant 
opportunities (i.e. job As Gary Becker5  (1993) puts it, 
are the most important investments in human capital. [S]tudies have shown that  for many 
years from over a hundred countries with different cultures and economic systems. The earnings of 
 
4 Actual PSA Agreement with oil-rich Timor-Leste (East Timor) regarding oil and gas extraction. Out of 
a 30-page contract, very little is given in terms of developing nationals or empowering them except on  a 
token level, as: Goods, Services, Training and Employment. 
Each Contractor shall comply with the proposals which accompanied its application under Article 13 of 
the Act for this Agreement in respect of training, employment and the acquisition of goods and services,  
 
5 Specific  human capital refers to skills or knowledge that is useful only to a single employer or 
industry, whereas general human capital (such as literacy) is useful to all employers (Becker, 1993).  
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more educated people are almost always well above average, although the gains are generally 
larger [emphasis research in less developed countries.
empowerment (Menon, 2001); it only addresses skills building, assuming the opportunities will
await. It does not consider racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious bias. While many of the extraction 
companies meet the criterion of or no empowerment or ensured opportunity
aspects of these programs. Ironically, most PSAs, while professing to develop a host nation s 
citizenry via employment preference, are written by lawyers, accountants and engineers who have
little, if no, experience in human resource development (Jennings, D., et al, 2000). An engineering 
culture and mindset thus can ensue in the organization (Udwadia, 1986).
Methods
Yin (2003) has endorsed holistic case study. Additionally, Stake (1995: 17) states, [I]ssues...
are not simple and clean, but intricately wired to political, social, historical, and especially personal 
contexts. All these meanings are important in studying cases . A training study was evaluated in
Company A in Asia in 2006 over a period of six months and focused on the production operations
department in an upstream oil company. Based on management interview in Company A, the LBE (Lead
Board Engineer) position was identified and has an NPV (net present value) of $388,000 USD, for a 
projected 5-year value of approximately $500,000 to the company. 6 This was a valued developmental 
position for local people.
Productions operations also had its own training department (initially unknown to the
researcher), with three rotating departmental trainers (this was completely separate of the centralized 
NTB training department, also known as the Workforce Development Group (WDG)). However and
this is important due to the unique nature of Asian oil (deep wells, high pressure of reservoir, crude oil
that is laden with H2SO4 [sulfuric acid], etc.), LBEs needed to receive additional training under a special
projects budget that was considered core proprietary information of Company A. In other words, the real 
costs of training cannot be ascertained and were only extrapolated from three input variables: NTB (X1), 
Operations (X2), and Capital Expenditures or CAPEX (X3) budgets.
In short, there was lack of a robust numerator (or outcome value, Y) in the model equations to
derive a return benefit for the LBE, except for approximations by the incumbent operations managers. It 
is noted that the LBE is developed as a result of direct company training in country, unlike other oil
positions in RMG and drilling that are produced by training the incumbent internationally. See Fig. 1.
Figure 1. Three separate training budgets model defined as successive X input variables to determine 
the singular competency output (Yi) of a functional Lead Board Engineer (LBE). All three factors are
reimbursable under the PSA. (Source: author)
Analysis
6 Interviews with production managers of Company A Asia subsidiary between January and June 2006. 
The company, while a genuine foreign invested oil production entity, is not named for proprietary and
non-disclosure reasons.
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Figure 2. LBE position creation in Co. A: benchmark SE US operations v. Co. A Asia operations. 
(Source: author) 
We can see from Figure 2 that our control group of structured training, (Xi) directly leads to full 
creation of a solo operator LBE (Yi) in the plant. This is what happens at Company A s 
operations in the US. This is supported by a well-
is not the case in Company A s Asian subsidiary that uses unstructured on-the-job training (OJT). As was 
originally stated in the indemnity, Company A s subsidiary operations LBE output in Asia per 
international benchmarks are only considered near 65-70%. It is also noted that the first input variables 
(X1) in Company A s Asia operations are not supported with a structured training, but rather an 
unstructured one. The question in all this is how much more training needs to be placed into the 
unstructured variables, (X1+ X2+ X3) to get to the criterion (benefit) output variable of an internationally 
accepted solo operator/LBE at 100% output ? Namely, the unstructured OJT inputs of (X1+ X2+ X3)create 
considerable uncertainty while adding costs (fully reimbursed) into this developmental regression.7  
Conclusions 
Terminal outputs such as the LBE define best the development goals Company A was trying to 
arrive at, and then a value can be placed on that output. The PSA agreement tends to work against these 
goal ideals, however, as reimbursement is ensured whether the outcomes are substandard, unstructured, or 
the development costs are overpriced. Yet, structured training and mentoring tends to reduce overall costs 
and promote efficiency. Development costs need to include indirect costs (employee salaries) and, 
likewise, hidden costs (lost retention). Anything that can be used to reduce costs will create a smaller 
denominator and will likewise increase overall ROI (benefit). Yet, the PSA encourages large 
denominators due to its reimbursement schema (Machmud). The most valued localized output created in 
Company A s US operations is a solo operator/LBE via established technical training plans girded by 
structured mentoring. Yet, this was not the case in Company A s Asia operations, where a significant lack 
of training structure existed.  Again, the PSA does not audit any training outcomes. Furthermore, these 
trainings are not polycentric (adapted to Asia) but rather ethnocentric (adapted to the US), which creates 
learning transfer problems and will not work without identification of: 1. Learner, 2. Environment, 3. Job 
(Rothwell, 1992). It appears that much of the training given is used to complement current compensation 
schemes that are manipulated by the government to keep oil salaries low nationwide. If that is the case, it 
sends a compromised message regarding compensation, whereby it minimizes overall HRD effectiveness 
by tying offsite training to compensation perks. Training should be formalized in HR development policy 
and not used to complement a weak compensation scheme. Company A s talent retention shortfalls and 
lack of human resource planning highlighted the compensation issue. 
 
7 Econometric or statistical model specification processes are available to identify underlying functional 
form and can estimate the coefficients of the variables in these equations (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, 
Lutkepohl, and Lee, 1988).  
LBE training via 
Mentoring 
 
Solo Int. LBE 
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LBE training  via 
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Mentoring 
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Co A.  Subsidiary In Asia Situation 
Xi = Structured  training plans Yi = 100% 
Yj = 70 % Xj =  (NTB (X1) + OPS (X2) + CAPEX (X3)) 
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 Finally, we want to note that in the lack of transparency and default to proprietary information  
clauses, it appears the training reimbursable under the PSA is abused as a conduit for padding expenses 
and payoffs. This happens as the PSA ensures that training reimbursements remain unaudited for learning 
transfer. Effectively then this works inversely to human capital investments as the mechanism itself is 
anathema to HRD objectives. What can be effectively noted is that the PSA appears steeped in colonial 
ideas that, as written, do little or nothing for the local population s development, but rather to protect 
investors. Nonetheless, their effect on human capital development is profound and can be co-opted. It has 
already been demonstrated in much literature that leadership in oil-rich countries can easily overlook 
constituents (Mikesell, ) and the natural state  or bargains struck by elites can exclude most citizens.  
Implications for practice  
As a pretext to human capital development, the author puts forward that the system of PSA does 
little to promote contemporary HRD. In fact, the PSA works directly against human capital development, 
as it encourages overspend, redundancy, and conflict of interests, since these costs are fully reimbursed 
and there is no learning audit or skills transfer oversight. Any human capital discussion in a resource rich 
developing country, without acknowledging the hole in the bucket  of the PSA agreement and 
development initiatives, is useless in the current system to derive and promote change, as it will not (and 
simply cannot) further any significant development or employment outcomes.  
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